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ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the budgeting challenges posed at a national 
level especially at a time of fiscal crisis and suggests some policy 
prescriptions to improve the functioning of the Greek public 
financial system. It focuses on the Public Financial Management and 
budgeting framework. In that regard, the paper highlights the need 
for a strategic and comprehensive review of the system as a whole 
and stresses the importance of a coordinated and phased approach 
for the overhaul of the various system components. A set of tools and 
methods for reform is presented and analyzed aiming at a 
convergence with international best practices over the long run. 
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1. Introduction 
The magnitude of the needed fiscal adjustment facing Greece is rapidly being 
acknowledged at a national and EU level. The fiscal pressure added by the 
current financial crisis has led to an unprecedented upward revision of the 
deficit and debt, uncovering the weaknesses of an already dysfunctional and 
bloated public sector. Furthermore, the revenue losses emanating from the 
reduction of the structural funding by the European Union for the coming years 
and the mounting fiscal pressure generated from an increasingly ageing 
population render significantly more urgent the plan for a strong and 
coordinated approach to fiscal consolidation. 
Cutting Greek deficit by about 10%-12% of GDP is undoubtedly a challenging 
but unavoidable task in order to retain sustainability of the country’s public 
finances. As Alcidi and Gros (2010) point out a fiscal adjustment of this rate is 
or has been possible in the past, namely in the early 1990s (referring to a 11% 
of GDP improvement in the primary balance). However, the consolidation 
intended aimed mainly at revenue increases rather than expenditure constraints, 
despite which the debt-to-GDP ratio continued to increase. Given the present 
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predicament and a possible scenario dictating the exclusion of Greece from 
financial markets for a certain period of time, it seems imperative to come to 
terms with a transformation of the budget system to one more compatible with 
the fiscal realities.      
Tackling this problem would entail adopting a more active approach on budget 
management in order to increase credibility and sustainability of the system as 
a whole. Opting for a large scale reduction of public expenditure, as reflected 
mostly in significant wage cuts, is decidedly an inevitable remedial measure for 
policy makers. However in a medium and long term perspective anticipating 
compliance with quantitative targets without proceeding to a reform of 
underlying problems of fiscal policy and management issues will prove to be 
insufficient. Ensuring control over expenditures and stabilizing the economy 
through an adjustment of fiscal aggregates is only one part of a modern budget 
system. The other involves improving effectiveness and efficiency of public 
spending and service delivery providing incentives for enhanced productivity. 
As resources become scarce, providing more efficient public services with less 
spending has become an absolute necessity1. This shift in public financial 
management towards a more “results-oriented” approach invites to a substantial 
change in the way government policies are designed, pursued, and audited. The 
transition from an incremental to a decremental path of rationalizing and 
                                                 
1
 Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2003), suggested that the same policy objectives in Greece could 
have been met by employing only 73% of the inputs used accordingly. More cost-effective 
management in the public sector would release labour resources for the private sector in future decades.  
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budgeting is the tough and rapid response the Greek government has to elicit in 
order to counter the shortfall in economic performance. 
Therefore, redesigning budget processes to serve the new political and fiscal 
realities has become a key element in Greece. Improving the quality of budget 
institutions, procedures and tools is particularly critical in times of crisis, as 
governments ought to be able to screen out diverse options and make the most 
cost-effective choices in a politically acceptable manner (Schick, 2004). This 
paper assesses public financial management practices in Greece as well as the 
quality of interactions and managerial linkages between them with a view to 
streamlining the budget. It thus addresses some possible ways of reengineering 
budget processes throughout the budget cycle and highlights some key points 
for consideration regarding monitoring and control of public expenditure. 
 
2. Budget Formulation System and Fiscal Sustainability 
The processes of budget elaboration in Greece should be examined with respect 
to two main objectives, aggregate expenditure control and strategic allocation 
of resources, in order to assess its adaptability to changing environments as 
well as its linkage with the rest of the budget process. As Tommasi (2007) 
reaffirms a good preparation of the budget plays a vital role in the overall 
budgetary process and affects consequently the balance of the public financial 
system as a whole. 
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In order for the budget to work as an effective instrument of public financial 
management, it should first of all be credible and affordable. Thus, the 
formulation of the budget must be founded on a sound financial basis and a 
good estimate of revenue. In that sense the establishment and use of a coherent 
framework of macroeconomic assumptions in the budget process is a key 
element to good coordination of the budget process. When designing an 
expenditure program the two starting points should include a realistic 
assessment of resources likely to be available to the government and the 
establishment of fiscal objectives (Schiavo-Campo, 2007).  
Nevertheless, in Greece, there seems to be an asymmetric relation between the 
design and public availability of macroeconomic forecasts and their actual 
integration in the preparation of expenditure proposals during the budget 
process. The macroeconomic forecasts produced by the Macroeconomic 
Analysis Department of the Ministry of Finance are ineffectively used when 
configuring expenditure proposals in the ministries and regions. This practice 
has long been criticised (IMF, 2006) on the grounds of a certain level of 
autonomy that line ministries tend to develop regarding the establishment of 
forecasts (OECD, 2008). In addition, the lack of explicit fiscal policy 
objectives and the absence of budget policy targets in line with the overall 
fiscal policy, reflect the risk of an overestimation of the forecasts and the need 
for an adjustment.  
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Hence, a major risk run by governments is the deviation from the forecasts of 
key economic assumptions that underlie the budget. For the establishment of 
forecasts the Macroeconomic Analysis Department benefits from the input of 
other institutions, such as the General Accounting Office and the Bank of 
Greece. Nevertheless, there is no public institution providing forecasts to be 
used in comparison with these ones (IMF, 2006). Incorrect economic 
assumptions can tremendously harm any form of fiscal consolidation programs, 
and consequently, influence the general fiscal balance. In that sense, special 
attention should be drawn initially when establishing these assumptions, by 
putting in place safeguards against any surprising outturn2. In Canada, for 
example, the government opted for the use of “prudent” economic assumptions 
and for the incorporation of a contingency reserve. Rather than focusing on 
internally generated forecasts, the government started to compare and make use 
of forecasts established by the private sector, adapting them downwards, and 
thus gaining trust both in the eyes of the public and of financial markets. The 
Netherlands have structured their system in a quite different way and design 
their policies on the basis of the less optimistic scenario prepared by the 
independent Central Planning Bureau (Blondal, 2003).  
To this end, the creation of a national independent institution with a large 
discretion or influence on fiscal policy making could also be envisaged. 
Attention could be drawn to provide proper information for the formulation of 
                                                 
2
 The recent initiative to guarantee the independence of the statistics in Greece by the enactment of Law 
3832/2010 regarding the creation of the Hellenic Statistical Authority in March 2010 seems to be a step 
in the right direction.  
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the state budget, such as unbiased macro-economic or budgetary forecasts, to 
produce analysis on fiscal policy issues, such as long-term sustainability, 
alternative estimates on the budgetary impact of certain policy measures, 
assessments on the breaching of fiscal rules, or to publish recommendations on 
specific policies (European Commission, 2006) To this end, Sweden proceeded 
to the creation in 2007 of a Fiscal Policy Council, aiming at increasing 
transparency of fiscal policy making, and subsequently, ensuring trust in the 
fiscal policy framework (European Commission, 2009). Other countries have 
adopted a different path. The United States have recently called for the creation 
of a bipartisan Fiscal Commission to identify policies aiming at an improved 
fiscal balance in the medium term, and an enhanced fiscal sustainability over 
the long run, as a better way to solve the remainder of the fiscal challenge 
(Orszag, 2010). 
These last remarks could be associated with the need to define aggregate 
expenditure estimates consistent with the medium-term macroeconomic 
framework and to clearly state the government’s fiscal objectives in a medium-
term perspective. By illuminating the impact of current policy decisions on 
future budgets, a government can evaluate intended implications and decide 
upon exceeding or not by its action the limits of a sustainable fiscal position.  
However, in Greece, despite the use of some aggregate forward estimates, 
pertaining to budget deficit and debt, the budget process as a whole tends to 
focus on the current fiscal year. Accordingly, deficit and debt ratios for the 
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general government are used, but they seem to lack integration and 
institutionalisation in the budget process3. As a consequence, the government’s 
ability to control fiscal sustainability is limited, which in turn is reflected in 
policy-making decisions and in the responsibility carried out by managers in 
being sufficiently foresighted and forward looking4 (Tarschys, 2002). The 
Stability and Growth Program presented in January 2010 portrays the intention 
to shift this practice towards a three year rolling perspective of planning, which 
would undeniably give public financial management in Greece a more strategic 
orientation.   
To achieve this many countries have gone even further with the development of 
multi-year budgeting. Multi-year expenditure planning has become an integral 
part of many countries public financial management system, including the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom for more than a decade. 
France has also recently embarked on that process, influenced by the UK 
Spending Review model (Hughes, 2008). Nevertheless, budgetary procedures 
in Greece have been safeguarded on a firm annual cycle. The new orientation 
for the budgetary process foreseen for 2011, including a widening of the time 
horizon to a three year base seem to guide the way to a more modern system 
(Greek Ministry of Finance, 2009).  
                                                 
3
 It should be mentioned, though, that the medium term forecast in Greece is not updated alongside the 
budget preparation process. However, in other countries like Sweden for example, the medium term 
fiscal framework has an impact on virtually the whole process of budget preparation. Furthermore, this 
outlook not only forms an integral part of the planning and programming horizon but embraces the 
relationship with the Parliament as well (Ljungman, 2007). 
4
 With a one year perspective, several upward trends can be experienced the following fiscal years. 
Very often a certain cutback in an item can re-emerge as a cost increase somewhere else, as for 
example when ending a vaccination program, which may eventually suggest higher expenditure for 
health care and sickness insurance benefits (Tarschys, 2002).   
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Furthermore, with a view to enhancing fiscal sustainability many countries 
including Australia, the UK, New Zealand and the US have also drawn upon 
the use of long-term projections. These should however be used with caution 
and should preferably be fenced and not integrated as such into the budget 
process, as they constitute a simple assumption on future prospects. Optimising 
their use would entail reporting them in a separate document and incorporating 
key findings in a supporting schedule included in the budget, as foreseen in the 
UK. Australia publishes an intergenerational report every five years, which is 
annexed to the annual budget (Schick, 2005). The current crisis has contributed 
to a more intense focus on the long term for the USA as well (National 
Research Council and National Academy of Public Administration, 2010). The 
annuality of these reports, and the institutionalisation of the process, guarantees 
that all relevant information will be used properly into the budget. OECD 
highlights the need for a report evaluating the long-term sustainability of 
policies to be produced every five years or when major modifications of 
revenue or expenditure plans take place (OECD, 2002).        
In practice, a top-down budgeting system is usually associated with the above, 
allowing ministries to focus on setting aggregate limits and sector expenditure 
ceilings for line ministries. The outset of budget preparation is a clear 
determination of fiscal targets and their integration in a strategic framework 
setting out policy objectives and activities. Thus, setting of a hard constraint on 
expenditure to line ministries from the beginning of the process, rules out the 
risk of a resource allocation dysfunction. The budgeting system should, 
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therefore, provide a tighter link between government policies and the allocation 
of resources through the budget, leading to stronger coordination between line 
ministries. However, the formulation of the budget is more of an open-ended 
process in Greece, and requests are made by spending ministries without clear 
indications of financial restraints. Line ministries are not encouraged to propose 
any savings as their right to propose new activities is not safeguarded5. 
Additionally, in a context of fiscal constraint like the present one, improving 
budget management involves opting for good expenditure prioritization 
(Schick, 2009). A hard choice has therefore to be made among ineffective or 
inefficient programs and new policy initiatives with high political priority. 
Countries like Australia and Canada have established a separate system for 
consideration of new policy proposals, by requiring line ministries to submit 
their new policy proposals separately and by imposing more rigorous scrutiny. 
Chile adopted the same approach as well, included in its “Bidding Fund”. 
Associated with this practice is the integration of expenditure review work into 
the annual budget process, however difficult this might be, with Australia and 
Canada proceeding to “strategic review” processes (Robinson, 2009). Greece 
has not yet embarked on such a platform, although some indications have been 
put forward for the introduction of zero-based budgeting. However, considering 
the tough fiscal consolidation pursued, building a closer link with such 
practices could have a positive impact on budget management. 
                                                 
5
 Gösta Ljungman (2009) highlights the case of Korea, where prior to the reform, the overestimation of 
spending proposals reached about 30% as well as the case of Finland. The latter one used another 
technique to diminish the tendency of over-evaluating resource requests, by publicizing the initial 
budget submissions.   
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3. Budget Transparency and Quality of Budgetary Decisions 
The recent predicament of Greek public finances has raised the question of 
optimisation of the use of fiscal information in the budget process. As no 
responsible decision on allocation of public funds can be made without 
sufficient fiscal evidence nor any evaluation or projection of relevant volumes 
can be sustained reliably, it seems imperative to proceed rapidly to a 
comprehensive overview of the whole system.  
Insisting on the credibility of government data goes along with the 
comprehensiveness and transparency of all relevant information concerning the 
state budget. At present, despite the country’s European obligations and the 
relevance of general government deficit and debt ratios to GDP, most 
publications focus heavily on central government and create an incomplete 
image on the fiscal situation of general government (HM Treasury, 2002). 
Considering the fact that general government expenditure and revenue figures 
function as a better indicator of public sector activity and taxation issues, it 
would be advisable to move towards a more comprehensive framework of 
public finances, including a proliferation of publications regarding all aspects 
of budget management. For that reason OECD’s publication on Budget 
Transparency sets forth a list of budget reports to be published by governments, 
not only to the interest of public management but also for effective scrutiny by 
the legislature and by civil society (Blondal, 2003).  
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In practice, in order for budget institutions to monitor and review the quality 
and effectiveness of the spending decisions and actions of the government, they 
need to have in their possession the right instruments as well as accurate, 
reliable and timely information that they can use in that way. However, in order 
to do so, they need to have an overview of objectives, outputs and expected 
results. The introduction of program budgeting has thus been put forward in 
Greece, as another means of improving and aligning fiscal management with 
international practices. As opposed to the previous system which was marked 
by an intensively detailed input orientation of the budget, containing some 
14,000 items (OECD, 2008), and lacking practically any information on results 
and performance, the new system is struggling to break with the past and to 
introduce a new and more modern budget framework. The National Plan of 
Programs for 2009 was the first comprehensive image of program budgeting 
and policy design in Greece6.  
 
                                                 
6
 The new classification contained 12 functions, 80 programs and 710 actions. According to the Greek 
organization of the system, Functions and Programs have a multi-ministerial perimeter as opposed to 
Actions which are assigned to the responsibility of a single Ministry. Each Action corresponds to the 
present line item classification of the budget, in order to comply with the use of the present information 
system and also to facilitate the transition to the new system (Ministry of Finance, 2009).  
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Figure 1. Program Budgeting in Greece. 
      
Source: Ministry of Finance, State Budget 2009, Executive summary, Program Budgeting 2009  
A necessary and privileged tool for the exchange and exploitation of all data 
regarding budget execution is the choice of an accounting system, which 
should thus be carefully considered. The way in which information is recorded 
and presented plays a vital part in the balance of the system as a whole. 
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Accounting for the Greek budget is on a cash basis, concerned mainly with the 
recording of cash receipts and payments and is therefore preferred for 
operational simplicity7. However, the lack of essential information on all other 
transactions, including stocks of assets and liabilities stands as an impediment 
to a more comprehensive view of the financial situation of the state. 
For this reason, many countries have taken the path to accruals with a view to 
making the cost of government action and the impact of its commitments more 
transparent and to improve the decision-making process supported by enriched 
information (Blondal, 2003). The United States prepares financial reports on an 
accrual basis, France has recently introduced accrual accounting, the United 
Kingdom ultimately adopted accrual accounting and budgeting for the central 
government, Australia and New Zealand both were aligned with the practice of 
accrual reporting and budgeting too (Khan and Mayes, 2009). The shift to an 
accrual basis of accounting does not however impose a complete removal of 
cash accounting practices, as a full statement of cash flows is necessary for 
operating, investing and financing activities (IPSAS and GFSM 2001). Greece 
has shown the intention of transitioning as a first step to a modified cash basis 
accounting system and eventually to an accrual based one (SGP, 2010).  
Furthermore, Khan and Mayes (2009) argue that for the system to be effective 
the Chart of Accounts should adopt the budget classification, which is the case 
                                                 
7
 More specifically, there are six different public sector accounting systems including one for hospitals, 
social security funds, municipalities, public law entities, local authorities and the central government, 
the Directorate of Public Accounts of the GAO having the overall responsibility of centralising relevant 
information (OECD, 2008)  
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for Greece as dictated by article 73(2) of the budget law. It should also include 
additional accounts, outside the scope of the ones described in the budget 
classification, for accounting and reporting purposes. Furthermore, if a 
government opts for an accrual regime, while holding on a cash budget, it is 
essential that in its reports it preserves a dual nature of accounts in order to halt 
any surpassing of limits, often based on cash or commitment concepts (Khan 
and Mayes, 2009).      
However, the scope and use of all relevant information should be considered in 
relation to effective public scrutiny as far as important budgetary decision 
making is concerned. The Constitutional revision of 2001 was marked by the 
desire to establish a more influential position of the legislature in the budget 
process. Article 79 of the Constitution was amended leading to the introduction 
of pre-budget consultations of the Ministry of Finance with the relevant 
parliamentary standing committee. Furthermore, the new Constitutional 
revision of 2008 has led to an enhanced role of the legislature in the budget 
formulation. During the discussion of the draft budget, the Parliament may 
submit proposals for the modification of individual items of the budget which 
are introduced to the Plenum and are voted upon, provided that these 
modifications have no actual impact over the total expenditures and revenues of 
the State. Moreover, the 2008 revision of the Standing Orders enhances 
parliamentary information by imposing a monthly report on the budget outturn 
and a quarterly one on the execution of the budget and the management of 
public finances. 
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In practice, the desire for a shift in public financial management and budgeting 
requires inevitably a revised legal framework, institutionally and politically 
strong to support such a major review of the system. Although there is a 
consensus on the increasing need for clear rules and a clear legal context to 
guide and safeguard the budgeting system, as regards budget processes and the 
identification of roles and responsibilities, no such measures have been adopted 
to date (SGP, 2010). So far, the reform has been legally anchored in the current 
legal context. The budget execution procedure in Greece is regulated by the 
Constitution and Law n.2362 of 1995, which provides the main legal 
framework for budget expenditure, revenues and public accounting. As a 
supplement to this regulatory framework, at the outset of each fiscal year the 
government issues instructions and guidelines for the budget execution. 
Nevertheless, budget execution procedures have not yet been aligned to the 
new budget structure and culture. They tend to display a focus on “traditional 
procedures” based on detailed input compliance and controls (IMF, 2006). 
Despite the fact that a pilot phase of program budgeting has been initiated since 
2008, no harmonization of the legal background underpinning the evolved 
practices has taken place, rendering the system opaque and ambiguous as to the 
rights and obligations of all actors participating and more complex regarding 
the transition process8. As Glaser (2007) notices performance oriented 
                                                 
8
 The legal framework governing the budget system serves multiple needs simultaneously such as the 
establishment of permanent as opposed to temporary rules, the incorporation of principles in law 
instead of formal agreements, the supremacy of the legislature in national financial matters, the 
enhancement of macroeconomic stability, and an improvement of budget transparency by clarifying to 
citizens the rules of the budgeting system (Lienert and Jung, 2004). 
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management must be perpetually adjusted and shaped to fit the changing 
decision-making needs of dynamic administrations and presented in a format 
that can be understood by citizens.    
When envisaging a more sound financial management system in a legalistic 
cultural setting, as is the case for Greece, it seems imperative to incorporate all 
relevant modifications of the budget system into new or existing principles of 
organic or ordinary law. In contemplating or implementing a public financial 
management reform, the elaboration of a legal framework governing the system 
could be beneficial in terms of both presentation of the strategy underpinning 
this change and identification of processes and relations between institutions 
and various actors.  
In that sense, a reinforcement of the principle of stability or predictability, 
complementary to the Stability and Growth Pact, could be foreseen as regards 
the elaboration of the budget an the regularly updated estimation of public debt 
in a medium-term regulatory framework. This commitment should thus be 
accompanied by the obligation to present to the legislature the relevant forward 
projections, allowing them to be further examined in the light of long-term 
fiscal strategy (Lienert and Jung, 2004). Spain proceeded to the adoption of a 
General Act of Budgetary Stability in 2001, consequently amended in 2006, 
which provided for further details and enhanced monitoring of the system 
leading to a series of sanctions in case of non respect (Núñez Pérez, 2007). The 
UK’s Code for Fiscal Stability serves also as an example, requiring fiscal and 
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debt management policy to be formulated and executed in line with some 
predetermined principles. The 2010 Greek budget clarified explicitly the 
intention to elaborate a “code of budgetary discipline and stability” which will 
definitely strengthen and elucidate fiscal management articulation in the public 
sector.   
Other countries like France formalized the principle of sincerity regarding 
budgetary forecasting. This principle inspired by private sector accounting 
implies that all information provided by the State should be accounted for in 
terms of exhaustivity, coherence and precision and can thus be translated into 
an interdiction to the State to underestimate public expenditure or to 
overestimate the revenue presented in the annual budget (Sénat, 2006). In view 
of the recent problems pertaining to the collection, presentation and 
consolidation of fiscal information, Greece could proceed to an 
institutionalization of this principle, the respect of which in turn could lead to 
an improvement of the use of all relevant data underpinning the State budget. 
A formalization and intensification of the principles of transparency and 
efficiency could also prove to be beneficial as a guide to the new budget 
behaviour. An essential point about the first one consists in the requirement of 
government action to be open to citizens, offering extensive information and 
knowledge of decisions affecting fiscal policy as well as access to data on 
public accounts. This need for information is intrinsically linked with the 
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demand for improved performance and results of government action, as a 
means of optimizing the use of public funds. 
 
4. Budget Execution and Fiscal Consolidation 
The execution phase of the budget process seems to be decisive as to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the decision making and programming 
capacities of the administration. Aligning the execution phase of the budget and 
treasury design with the aforementioned reforms with the aim to enhance fiscal 
discipline is a necessary task. Expenditure management and more specifically 
commitment controls play a significant role. This type of measure serves to 
ensure the control of expenditure and is usually applied to contain expenditure 
before commitments are made, when it is still possible to influence the final 
expenditure levels (Tandberg, 2005). This type of control contributes 
substantially to the determination of an overall expenditure control framework 
as well as monitoring the accumulation of payment arrears, by imposing a limit 
on commitments on the basis of either budget appropriations or cash plans 
(Radev and Khemani, 2009).   
In Greece, however, multiple expenditure controls take place after the 
commitment phase of expenditure, and thus, limit their scope to cash payments 
instead of restraining current liabilities. In addition, this type of controls is left 
to the line ministries, leading to the carry-over of unpaid obligations from one 
year to another (IMF, 2006). To avoid such mismatches, some countries -
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including Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland- have opted for 
commitment budgeting. In cases like France -since 2006- and Italy, 
commitment appropriations cover all types of expenditure (current and future). 
In others like Germany and Switzerland, they apply to multiyear expenditure, 
whereas in Switzerland they usually supplement cash appropriations (Blondy, 
2009a). Greece could benefit from these examples and reorient its fiscal 
consolidation through this channel, too. 
Additionally, a good and active cash management practice could also be 
envisaged. Modern cash management responds mainly to the need for ensuring 
the availability of a sufficient amount of cash to meet the government’s 
obligations in the most cost-effective way (Storkey, 2003). This is usually done 
through a treasury single account (TSA), by means of minimizing the cost of 
borrowing, maximizing returns on idle cash, and investing temporary surpluses 
productively (Lienert, 2009). However, the imbalances between the timing of 
payments and the availability of cash can sometimes lead to unexpected 
situations of cash surpluses or cash shortfalls, depending upon the seasonality 
of cash inflows. In Greece, the cash management system is dominated by a 
control of cash payments for expenditure. Payment operations are effected 
through a government account, which operates as a quasi treasury single 
account (IMF, 2006). Nevertheless, a more firm and effective cash 
management could be institutionalised, ensuring tighter information exchanges 
for regular or less predictable flows between various actors, preserving 
minimum cash balances and refining cash flow projections.  
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Furthermore, it would be advisable for Greece to establish a better coordination 
between revenue-collecting agencies and the treasury9 and a closer link 
between cash management, expenditure commitments and debt management. 
This would imply aiming at foreseeing possible delays in cash disbursements, 
adopting targets for end-day balances10 and establishing an improved 
articulation between the bond issuance program and the cash profile.  
In that respect, it would also seem essential for the case of Greece and the 
recent shortfalls in revenue collection, to better integrate seasonality of cash 
inflows in the public management process. As far as revenue is concerned, 
Lienert (2009) proposes a more frequent payment of tax on a monthly basis or 
even a review of tax regulations from a cash management perspective. 
Regarding expenditure, in-year flexibility and carry-over rules should be 
reviewed as well. OECD (2008) puts emphasis on the fact that many countries, 
like the United States, New Zealand, South Africa or even France, use specific 
quota as a limit for transfers within programs or classes of outputs. The 
provision for a potential reserve developed recently in Greece, with the 
intention of using 90% of budget appropriations seems to be an important step 
(SGP, 2010).  
 In terms of controllability, tax expenditure can also hamper the proper 
functioning of the budget process. The need to identify tax expenditures and to 
                                                 
9
 In the United States for example, special Treasury Tax and Loan accounts are used in order to assist 
the investment of Treasury funds in commercial banks until needed (Lienert, 2009). 
10
 End-day balances in France, the United Kingdom and the United States are respectively 100 million 
euros, 200 million pounds approximately and 5-7 billion dollars (Lienert, 2009).  
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control their growth, as a major source of fiscal leakage is a common concern. 
Greece has taken an important step towards a complete identification of tax 
expenditure, as shown in the 2010 budget. However, the Greek government did 
not take any measures regarding the control of their growth. The French 
government’s initiative to impose a rolling target, even though an indicative 
one, on the stock and evolution of tax expenditure with a view to imposing 
some type of discipline as over conventional expenditure is undoubtedly an 
important one (Hughes, 2008).          
Most importantly, though, management of the wage bill, constituting more than 
50% of recurrent costs and one of the biggest fractions of government 
expenditure, should be reviewed. Overcoming the risks and drawbacks of a 
high wage bill, as an additional source of macroeconomic imbalances, is 
particularly challenging in an era when fiscal consolidation is imposed to all 
states. When examining payroll management, one should bear in mind that 
payroll, as in the case of procurement, requires careful planning, budgeting, 
executing and auditing and therefore transcends the whole budget process 
(Pretorius and Pretorius, 2009).      
One of the most essential elements of a solid payroll management system is the 
linkage between a personnel database, or a “nominal roll”, which assembles 
information on the list of staff who should receive pay every month, the list of 
budgeted positions and the individual personnel records. In the case where 
these databases are not verifiable or harmonised, they immediately affect the 
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quality of budget estimates and thus the whole budget process, as they 
represent a significant amount of public expenditure (Bessette, 2010). Updating 
regularly and systematically all relevant information including all changes in 
personnel such as new hires, retirements or even transfers, can prevent the 
registration of multiple entries of a civil servant and thus eliminate the 
possibility of multiple wages. To this end, the realisation of a comprehensive or 
partial census is deemed necessary in order to strengthen transparency and 
credibility of all relevant data as well as a subsequent reconciliation with the 
personnel database (Bessette, 2010).  
Another organisational impediment which could be counterproductive to a 
coordinated approach of managing the wage bill is the organisational dualism 
created by the separation of functions between the personnel management 
offices that invite to new posts and the Ministry of Finance that provides the 
necessary funding. In practice this leads to a situation of no resource constraint 
and to a dependence upon the frequency of budget reviews. Premchand (1983) 
highlighted the need for a revision of pay structures and an integration of 
selected sections of personnel offices with finance ministries. Moreover, an 
integration of all these elements into a computerized network, suggesting some 
harmonisation between these two practices could certainly enhance the control 
and coherence of wage bill management. The Greek Ministry of Finance has 
recently made public its intention to establish a Single Payment Authority, as a 
first step towards a better coordination of payroll management (SGP, 2010).        
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Besides the need for better coordination, the Greek government should consider 
imposing personnel expenditure ceilings at the very outset of the budget 
process, the preparation stage and ensuring that there are adequate reinforcing 
mechanisms in place, aligning legal commitments related to personnel 
expenditure to spending limits. Although these ceilings may have certain 
disadvantages11, they contribute however to avoiding an over-commitment of 
personnel expenditures from the budget formulation stage (Allen and Tommasi, 
2001). Some countries have started including contractuals within the 
predetermined ceiling. France has recently proceeded to another channel of 
constraining personnel expenditure, by imposing mandatory caps on this type 
of expenditure to transfers of appropriations within the context of a 
programme. This asymmetric fungibility (“fongibilité asymmetrique”), despite 
some drawbacks linked to it, can be translated in the possibility to use savings 
on personnel costs for other types of expenditure without permitting the 
opposite.             
In order to support and enhance a more active and synchronised budget 
management, the government should also proceed to a modernisation of IT 
systems. Promoting a more responsible and strategic management of public 
funds, enriched with detailed and comprehensive information, entails 
necessarily a review of the IT architecture of the PFM system in Greece. A 
real-time integration of all relevant data and proper feedback unarguably 
                                                 
11
 In some cases, they may even incite spending agencies to avoid them by hiring consultants or 
external advisers. In the UK this type of ceilings were abolished in the 1980s and were replaced by 
operational cost ceilings because of this upward trend (Allen and Tommasi, 2001).   
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contributes to a more agile and flexible budget management regime, which 
subsequently prevents over-spending. Commitments reflected in real-time, 
accurate cash balances as well as the integration of the General Ledger in the 
budget system have an important impact on the budget. Other countries like 
Brazil have proceeded to the creation of a Public Spending Observatory, a 
permanent unit which on the basis of consolidating a variety of information 
technology solutions identifies and prevents cases of misappropriation and the 
attendant losses to public coffers (CGU, 2009). The Greek government has 
recently announced the development of a Management Information System 
incorporating the whole public sector for the control and monitoring of public 
expenditure (SGP, 2010).           
In order to enhance fiscal consolidation many countries have also opted for the 
introduction of fiscal rules, as a permanent constraint on fiscal policy (Kopits 
and Symansky, 1998). A recent study by the European Commission highlighted 
the fact that these types of rules are becoming a wide-spread policy tool across 
many EU countries (European Commission, 2009). These numerical targets for 
budgetary aggregates affecting budgetary balance, debt, expenditure or revenue 
developments enhance undoubtedly budgetary discipline and dissolve 
uncertainties as to future fiscal policy orientations. Nevertheless, these rules 
generate the desirable results only when monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms are set forth and when political will is strong enough to support 
them.  
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Hungary and Portugal made use of budget balance rules. The first one 
established an obligation for the general government primary budget balance to 
be in a surplus and the latter one determined annual net indebtedness limits for 
regional governments. Germany also established a new constitutional deficit 
rule, restraining the structural deficit of the Federation at 0.35% of GDP and 
imposing structurally balanced budgets for the regions (Blondy, 2009).  
Expenditure rules were adopted in Bulgaria and Lithuania. Hence, Bulgaria 
imposed a limit on the link between expenditure to GDP ratio of less than 40% 
and Lithuania linked expenditure ceilings to revenue. Furthermore, France has 
embraced a more pro-cyclical fiscal stance, as reflected in the adoption of a 
revenue rule, imposing an ex ante determination of the allocation of possible 
revenue surpluses. Moreover, France proceeded to the formalisation of a debt 
rule for social security, aiming at maintaining the terms of “social debt” 
repayment (European Commission, 2009). The Greek government has recently 
announced the desire to establish fiscal rules at a national level (SGP, 2010).  
However, one should bear in mind that fiscal targets are not self-enforcing. 
More importantly, they are needed to hold public agents responsible for the 
results of their actions. A US report has recently highlighted the importance of 
political accountability, shared by the President and the Congress, in the 
monitoring and enforcement of any given fiscal rule. The measures proposed in 
that direction include presidential accountability, enhanced accountability for 
achieving goals and targets, a periodic review of the drivers of fiscal challenge 
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and a consideration of the long-term cost of new policies (National Research 
Council and National Academy of Public Administration, 2010). 
 
5. Accountability, Audit and Efficiency of Public Spending 
Designing and setting up an adequate accountability and control structure is a 
significant aspect of any public spending environment. Increasingly complex 
budgetary systems impose the need for reliable and effective control systems. 
In order for the PFM system as a whole to remain in balance, a more coherent 
management and control space should be established with the aim to sustain a 
harmonisation between the organization of controls and the added value of 
effective service delivery (Bourgon, 2009).   
Improving accountability and control networks can thus be reflected in 
efficiency gains and can substantially modify the relationship between 
government bodies both horizontally and vertically, inciting government 
departments to work together in order to achieve the desired results set by 
politicians (Cook, 2004). In the past two decades, many countries have been 
experiencing substantial modifications within the government, including the 
creation of arm’s length bodies or the devolution of autonomy to existing 
government entities (OECD, 2005). Greece has had little experience in merging 
or separating public sector functions in a way that embraces a whole-of-
government culture for the oversight and democratic accountability of public 
bodies. The government’s approach to reforming the administrative apparatus 
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has been reserved and fragmentary, based on temporary social and political 
demands for change. 
Redefining a new role for the Ministry of Finance and more specifically for the 
central budget office is undeniably a demanding task. Such a task is associated, 
on the one hand, with the imperative for budgetary discipline, and on the other, 
with the need for flexibility and managerial freedom to act. The importance of 
this reconfiguration lies in the new role that the central budget office is called 
to play in a devolved environment that shifts decision making from the central 
institutions to line agencies. According to Schick (2001) a strong central budget 
office offering guidance on new ideas and practices can be one the office’s 
most salient roles during the transition period. However, once the initiation 
period has elapsed, it would be doubtful for the central budget office to 
counteract or mitigate the effects of managerial discretion. In that sense, Greece 
should also revamp the operations of its budget office and reinvent a new 
equilibrium between central control of expenditure and managerial freedom12. 
This behavioural revolution, inviting to a centrifugal dimension of public 
financial management, has yet to be envisaged and experienced in Greece, 
where still central control of expenditure seems to predominate.  
In order to achieve this, a move from ex ante to ex post control should be 
envisaged with a parallel enhancement of internal control processes. This 
means moving away from a system where control of transactions prior to 
                                                 
12
 At present, the Ministry of Finance interferes at all stages of the budget process and at a very detailed  
level, eliminating any sense of ownership of the line ministries budget, attenuating their accountability 
and thus removing any incentive for PFM improvement (IMF, 2006).  
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commitment was outside the line ministry to a new one where the line ministry 
assumes responsibility for resource allocation which is ultimately controlled 
externally (Ruffner and Sevilla, 2004).        
However, in Greece, the current control and accountability environment is not 
yet adjusted to the requirements of a devolved and results-oriented 
management. On the contrary, it is characterised by excessive and overlapping 
ex ante controls and an ex post organization inclined towards compliance and 
legality. At present, expenditure control in Greece is focused heavily on pre-
audit practices of legality and regularity of procedures, combining the 
intervention of line ministry financial administration units, the GAO de-
concentrated control offices or fiscal audit offices and the Court of Audit13. 
Despite the fact that this procedure applies to only a small fraction of public 
expenditure, the main disadvantage of the system lies in the fact that these 
multiple controls apply after the obligation has been incurred and have thus an 
impact on the cash payment instead of the current liabilities. Therefore, 
accountability is transferred from those who decide on the allocation of funds 
and the delivery of a service to those responsible for the control and approval 
of expenditure. HM Treasury (2002) has pointed out that an accumulation of 
                                                 
13
 HM Treasury (2002) has defined the impact of the current organisation of control processes in 
Greece on cost in three ways. The “cost of the control process itself”, the “cost in diverted management 
time”, defined as the time spent on the process rather than on the objective of control, and thirdly the 
cost derived from the fact that line management cannot assume full accountability for its own actions. 
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several layers of control can sometimes even have perverse effects, leading to a 
non-responsibility regime14.             
Changing the nature of control entails first of all strengthening internal controls 
and avoiding excessively centralized controls15. There is scope to move beyond 
financial control and to introduce internal audit procedures, as an instrument to 
improve public sector performance. Greek public administrators have 
embarked on this platform, which was enshrined in law No.3492/2006. This 
legal framework provided for the creation of a Directorate General for Fiscal 
Audits, aiming at improving management of the state budget and of all entities 
receiving public funds. To this end, an establishment of internal control units in 
every ministry and region are foreseen. Nevertheless, this framework still lacks 
full application, as a number of other legal instruments is needed for its 
enactment (OECD, 2008).  
In 2006 France made the transition to a renewed internal control system, 
moving to a more global and ex post oversight of public expenditure with the 
objective of finding a new balance between accountability and control of 
government action. It proceeded to a reorientation of accountability, unifying 
budgetary and financial controls. Hence the auditor guarantees ex ante that 
budgetary planning is coherent, sustainable and within the limits of 
parliamentary appropriations. Moreover, the auditor is in charge of monitoring 
                                                 
14
 It can in fact incite two adverse management attitudes, each control unit relies on the chain of 
controls to follow or the ones who preceded, leading to a situation where virtually no one assumes 
responsibility (HM Treasury, 2002).   
15
 The distribution of responsibilities needs to be clarified at a first place by assigning different roles 
and duties to departments and individuals, in a way that no one individual can control a process from 
start to finish (Tommasi, 2007).  
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all commitments of expenditure and of producing analyses and relevant 
information to the line ministry, the Ministry of Finance and the Parliament, 
providing also consulting services to the manager.  
However, as a response to strengthened internal controls comes logically the 
revision of external audit. In that sense, as internal control has focused more on 
financial reliability and compliance, external audit institutions have 
endeavoured an enhancement of government accountability, particularly 
through a tighter linkage with the legislatures (Ruffner and Sevilla, 2004).  
In many countries the role of supreme audit institutions has evolved, moving 
away from a simple verification of the legality and regularity of financial 
management and accounting to a more complex one, including also an 
assessment of efficiency and effectiveness of public administration (INTOSAI, 
1998). The United States Government Accountability Office has gone even 
further than that by engaging in policy advice and management 
recommendations (Ruffner and Sevilla, 2004). In Greece, however, no effective 
action has been undertaken in that direction. The Greek Court of Audit 
preserves its traditional stance, as described in article 98 of the Constitution, 
with a focus on legality and regularity of spending (OECD, 2008), and with no 
predetermined scope of stronger cooperation with the legislature, apart from the 
submission of two reports, focusing on the legality of detailed transactions. At 
present, we have no additional information on any reform agenda. 
Nevertheless, a shift in management processes should be accompanied notably 
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by a change in the control system to adequately incorporate a proper evaluation 
of government action, which is considered necessary in order to attain 
satisfactory international standards of external audit (IMF, 2006).        
In that regard, the Parliament’s oversight powers in budgetary matters should 
be enhanced as well. At present, the Standing Order of the Greek Parliament 
provides for the establishment of a Special Standing Committee, as a sub-
Committee of the Standing Committee on Economic Affairs, in charge of 
examining the Financial Statement and the General Balance Sheet of the State. 
Public scrutiny in that sense remains however limited, attenuated by the fact 
that there is a significant time lag in the process and examination of relevant  
information concerning the previous budget year (OECD, 2008). These 
documents are considered within 12 months after the end of the financial year 
to which they correspond, thus eliminating any effective dialogue or evaluation 
of previous government action and have no impact on the quality of resource 
allocation.  
On the other hand, legislatures who intend to have a prominent role in the 
budget process must retain an interest not only on public policies and priorities, 
but also on the way these are carried out. Therefore, they need to have in their 
possession the expertise and the right instruments to keep the pace with the 
need for effectiveness and transparency.  
In many countries, Public Accounts Committees, or departmentally-related 
committees as in Austria and Germany, are assigned to examine reports from 
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the supreme audit institution, frequently chaired by a member of the opposition 
(IPU, 2007). The Public Accounts Committee of the British House of 
Commons conducts detailed examinations of the National Audit Office’s 
“value-for-money” reports, taking evidence from government accounting 
officers. Furthermore, in Brazil the relevant committee has the right to require 
from the public auditor’s office special audits on accounts in case of 
irregularities and conversely in some other cases members of the supreme audit 
institution may have access to parliamentary committees, as for example in the 
Polish parliament. Sometimes, the committee can have direct access to 
government records, as in Nicaragua, or may ask the government for further 
information through a questionnaire, as is practiced in France (IPU, 2007). 
In Greece, nonetheless, parliamentary powers are still weak, in terms of 
legislative scrutiny and expertise as reflected also in the lack of parliamentary 
documentation and reports on government policies. The Greek Ministry of 
Finance has been recently envisaging the creation of a new independent 
committee under the aegis of Parliament to strengthen monthly control of 
budget accounts and to contribute substantially to the evaluation, oversight and 
monitoring of annual and multi-year budgets (SGP, 2010). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Redefining the budgeting framework, as well as methods and tools of fiscal 
governance that have been deemed obsolete and incompatible with the 
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demands of a complex socio-economic and political environment, is certainly a 
difficult and demanding task. One of the benefits of not belonging to the first 
wave of countries that experienced this transition is the opportunity to learn 
from their successes and failures. Although contextual variables should always 
be taken into consideration, as far as the administrative structure and values of 
the State are concerned, demands for improved fiscal governance at present are 
driven uniformly by the same trigger, to respond rapidly and efficiently to a 
post crisis environment. 
Linking the various elements of a public expenditure management system, 
regarding appropriation, programme delivery and impact assessment 
effectively presents certainly more or less some complications. Schick (2002) 
argues that for a public management reform to be successful an amalgam of 
opportunity, strategy and tactics is needed. Put simply, even a well articulated 
budgeting process cannot make the hard choices easier. But once these tough 
decisions have been made, a harmonised and coherent public financial 
management framework can certainly support leaders to engage efficiently in 
the long-term fiscal challenge. 
Above all, budgets are plans for future action and should be used accordingly. 
It seems though that the current budget framework and budget formulation 
process in Greece is oriented extensively towards the past, coupled with the 
need to respond to a mounting fiscal pressure inherited from past budget 
shortfalls. Espousing the interests and priorities of the moment with fiscal 
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legacies and future fiscal prospects seems imperative, especially at a time when 
the Greek economy encounters the threat of default. Transferring the needs of 
today’s taxpayers to the future compromising the State’s fiscal sustainability 
seems no longer to be a viable solution. 
     The required adjustment between government debt sustainability and fiscal 
policy in the years ahead, in view of the fact that Greece will continue to run 
sizable primary deficits over the medium term, is a risk that cannot be ignored. 
More limited fiscal space calls for improved policy decision-making, which can 
eventually pay great dividends and generate benefits for the country over the 
long run. This type of commitment involves not only assuring compliance with 
the rules and processes, but mainly improving performance and results. 
Imposing additional layers of control and enhanced reporting requirements that 
render the system not only dysfunctional but costly too, cannot always be 
reconciled with a performance environment that extols flexibility and a certain 
level of uncertainty. Instead, the real challenge for Greece will be to devise an 
optimal balance between the cost of these controls and the net public value of 
government services.  
From this perspective, the current crisis presents a unique opportunity to 
restructure budget decision making in Greece and to recast budgeting into a 
more sustainable, efficient, accessible and accountable process. 
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